LOFTER-网易轻博

https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-1174

Dario Borghesan

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: This case shows why retaliatory arrest claims should be governed by the well-grounded common-law rule that the existence of probable cause would protect against liability for enforcing the criminal law. First, these -- the determining causation in these claims is especially difficult for the reasons the Court recognized in Lozman.

And, second, the law's tools for filtering out speculative claims and giving officers a margin for error don't work well in these cases. And the Court doesn't want a rule where an officer can be haled into court on any routine arrest and forced to defend the purity of his motives, however reasonable his actions. Nor should the Court want a rule that gives officers a reason to hesitate in situations where they should be able to act decisively. I want to start with the point about complexity because I believe this case has all the elements the Court identified in Lozman. One, speech can be a valid consideration for the officers in deciding whether to effectuate an arrest.

(00:18:48)

Jeffrey B. Wall

Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: Two points.

First, every similar constitutional tort claim under 1983 has an objective requirement that prevents a purely subjective inquiry into officers' motivations. If anything, it is more important that claims of retaliatory arrest be subject to such a screen because, as the bipartisan states' brief from D.C. points out, they're easy to allege and difficult and expensive to defend against. Second, of the --